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The "Seven Dirty Words" Decision: A
Potential Scrubbrush for Commercials
on Children's Television?
By GERALD J. TmN*
INTRODUCTION
On February 28, 1978, the Federal Trade Commission
capped an extensive inquiry into television advertisements di-
rected to children.' The Commission unanimously voted to in-
stitute a rulemaking inquiry2 along the lines urged upon it by
a 340-page staff report produced by a special Children's Adver-
tising Task Force of the Commission.3 The Commission Staff
Report recommended that the Commission, in a rulemaking
proceeding, consider adoption of the following proposals to
remedy the "unfair" practices it found in the present system
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School. J.D., Univer-
sity of Iowa College of Law, 1960. Member, Iowa and Wisconsin Bars. FTC staff
attorney (Office of the General Counsel) 1963-70. Director, FTC Division of National
Advertising, 1970-73. Assistant to Director, FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection, 1973-
74.
As co-director of the Center for Public Representation, a non-profit public interest
law firm located in Madison, Wisconsin, Professor Thain has participated in the FTC
rulemaking proceeding concerning television advertising directed to children discussed
in this commentary. He presented, on behalf of the Center, the results of research
conducted by a team of academic specialists in consumer responses to mass communi-
cations messages, under a grant from the Commission. This testimony was presented
on January 19, 1979, in San Francisco. See Transcript, FTC TRR No. 215-60 (record
reference #LL-51).
The specific inquiry began with the arrival in 1977 of Michael Pertschuk as the
new chairman of the Federal Trade Commission. Advertising Age, Oct. 24, 1977, p. 1.
Pertschuk had expressed concern at his confirmation hearing over advertising to chil-
dren, and particularly over the manipulation of "sound and symbol" to exploit the
vulnerabilities of children. ANTrRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), No. 808, p. A-25, E-
7 (April 7, 1977). Prior to that hearing there had been a series of actions and proposed
actions at the FTC indicating concern with advertising messages directed to children.
See Thain, Suffer the Hucksters to Come Unto the Little Children? Possible Restric-
tions of Television Advertising to Children Under Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 56 BOSTON U. L. REv. 651, 661-64 (1976).
2 43 Fed. Reg. 17,967 (1978) (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. Part 461).
See AmrrausT AND TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), No. 853, p. A-1 (March 3, 1978).
Copies of the staff report may be obtained from the Federal Trade Commission, Distri-
bution and Duplication Branch.
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of television advertising to children:4
1. A prohibition of all commercials directed to pre-school
age children;
2. A prohibition of any advertisement for "highly sug-
ared" products, such as candies and snack food, directed to
children under 12;
3. A requirement that advertisers of heavily sugared
products, in return for being allowed to continue advertising to
children, provide financial support for "counter-messages"
which would urge good nutritional and health habits and cau-
tious consumer behavior upon children.
At this writing, the Commission has held the first of a
series of hearings concerning the rulemaking. Assuming, as is
expected, that the hearings will continue to a phase at which
all interested or affected parties will be provided the opportun-
ity to question and cross-examine those with opposing views on
matters which the Commission has determined to be in contro-
versy, the decision of the Presiding Officer at the hearings
would then be subject to an appeal to the five members of the
Commission.- They would review the recommendations of the
The FTC is authorized to proceed akainst advertising practices that are
"unfair," although they are neither deceptive ("deceptive" advertisements have a
tendency or capacity to deceive a significant percentage of the audience to which the
particular message is addressed. See generally, I. PRESTON, THE GREAT AMERICAN BLOW-
UP: PUFFERY IN ADVERTISING AND SELLING (1975); and S.C. OPPENHEIM & G. WESTON,
UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES AND CONSUMER PROTECTION 636-44 (3d ed. 1974)), nor violative
of antitrust principles. See Thain, supra note 1.
5 A Trade Regulation Rule is the administrative equivalent of a statute and carries
the force of law. See Kintner & Smith, The Emergence of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion as a Formidable Consumer Protection Agency, 26 MERCER L. REV. 651, 673-79, 681-
82 (1974) and statutory references therein.
The Commission instituted expedited procedures for the children's television ad-
vertising rulemaking proceeding pursuant to 16 C.F.R. § 1.20 (1978). The procedures,
adapted from the model followed by the Environmental Protection Agency, provided
that all information relevant to the proposed rule is to be submitted during the quasi-
legislative hearings. Participants are not allowed to direct questions to other partici-
pants or to cross-examine in this phase of the hearings, but are limited to submitting
written proposed questions to the Presiding Officer who may use or reject them. The
Presiding Officer may also ask questions of his own. If the Commission determines,
after a review of the quasi-legislative record, that there are disputed issues of material
fact that are necessary to resolve, it will order subsequent, quasi-judicial hearings to
resolve those issues. At this hearing, typical trial procedures, including cross-
examination and presentation of rebuttal witnesses, are used. See 43 Fed. Reg. 17,968
(1978). After the quasi-judicial proceedings have been held, the Presiding Officer will
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Presiding Officer and decide whether to affirm, reject, or mo-
dify them. Undoubtedly, if the Commission rendered a deci-
sion which would alter significantly the present state of adver-
tising to children on television, that decision would be ap-
pealed to the federal courts by affected broadcasters or adver-
tisers, eventually reaching the United States Supreme Court.
It should be noted that the FTC has neither taken nor
proposed any action within the last decade which has caused
greater outcry from industry and those who champion their
cause.' While it is true that the FTC rulemaking proceedings
probably will not reach a conclusion within the next two calen-
dar years-and it is quite possible that it will take much
longer 7-this is nonetheless an appropriate opportunity to con-
sider the Commission's authority in this context. A recent Su-
preme Court decision, FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,8 provides
persuasive arguments that efforts by the FTC to alter chil-
dren's advertising will pass constitutional scrutiny.
I have written elsewhere of the legal ability of the Federal
Trade Commission, exercising its authority under Section 5 of
promulgate a decision resolving the disputed issues. That decision is then subject to
the regular process of appeal to the five members of the Commission. 16 C.F.R. § 1.13
(1978); see 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 9801 (1978) Subpart B. The Commissioners'
determination, if adverse to the interests of broadcasters or advertisers, is subject to
review in the United States Court of Appeals. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (d) (1976).
1 For general descriptions of industry response to the proposed rule, see Candy
Makers Await FTC Proposal; Upset by 'Sticky' Charge From Cereals, Advertising Age,
Dec. 5, 1977, at 3; We're Not Like 'Sticky' Sweets, Cereal Markets Inform FTC,
Advertising Age, Nov. 28, 1977, at 1; Candy Spot Foes Insist on Ban, Not Counter-
Ads, Advertising Age, July 25, 1977, at 2, col. 4. See also BROADCASTING MAGAZINE,
March 6, 1978, at 86, 91 (denunciation of proposed Rule by broadcasters and organized
advertising groups); President of CBS Broadcast Group Attacks Proposed Rule, Adver-
tising Age, July 24, 1978, at 46.
Congressional response centered on efforts to block the FTC's use of appropriated
funds for promulgation of a Rule affecting children's advertising. After months of
debate during which appropriations for fiscal year 1979 appeared in jeopardy, the
House and Senate passed a bill funding the FTC, but prohibiting any use of the funds
to issue regulations dealing with television advertising to children. Presumably, hear-
ings on the proposed Rule may continue. Congress Lets FTC Begin Its Kid TV Hearing,
Advertising Age, Oct. 2, 1978, at 1, 98. See TRADE REG. REP. (CCH), No. 353, p. 1 (Oct.
4, 1978).
1 Earliest for Kids Ad Rule is Mid-80's: Pertschuk, Advertising Age, March 26,
1979 at 2, col. 4. The headline is slightly misleading because, as the article notes,
Chairman Pertschuk in fact has stated recently that it would be mid-1980 before the
Presiding Officer's report was ready for Commission consideration.
- 98 S. Ct. 3026 (1978).
1978-79]
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the Federal Trade Commission Act (arguably the most elastic
statute ever adopted by the United States Congress),' to issue
a Trade Regulation Rule which would eliminate or severely
restrict advertising on commercial television directed to chil-
dren.'0 However, in that article I~did not treat extensively the
validity of a first amendment defense to any limitations by the
Federal Trade Commission on the advertising which compa-
nies may place on television programs viewed by children." My
views as expressed in that article may be summarized as fol-
lows: advertising is "commercial speech," and although recent
decisions of the United States Supreme Court quite properly
have given greater protection to commercial speech than it may
have appeared to enjoy at times in the past,'2 the first amend-
ment to the Constitution'3 presents no obstacle to the legal
authority of the FTC to take actions such as those listed at the
beginning of this commentary.
The views of those who believe that the first amendment
presents a major stumbling block to the FTC's legal authority
(as opposed to political obstacles which, in my view, present
the major barrier to the proposed Rules)," I believe fair to
summarize as follows: recent decisions of the United States
Supreme Court have narrowed, if not abrogated, the distinc-
tion which earlier existed between the first amendment protec-
tions afforded "commercial speech" and "free speech." The
result of this narrowing is that if television advertisements di-
rected to children are neither deceptive, in the usual sense of
9 See, e.g., Baker & Baum, Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act: A
Continuing Process of Redefinition, 7 VmL. L. Rav. 517 (1962).
, Thain, supra note 1. See Oppenheim & Weston, supra note 4, at 600-03, 628-
40.
Thain, supra note 1, at 673-75.
Compare Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413
U.S. 376 (1973) with Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 413 U.S. 85
(1977).
'3 The first amendment provides, in part: "Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech. . ." U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
" An FTC staff memorandum written in 1977 (prior to Pertschuk's taking office
as chairman) recommended that the Commission take no action to limit broadcast
advertising directed to children. The memorandum stated: "A social decision of this
magnitude should be made only by the U.S. Congress." See Old Staff Memo Warns
FTC to Let Congress Handle Children's Ad Ban, Advertising Age, November 27, 1978,
at 100, col. 3.
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that word,"5 nor unsafe, in terms of the product advertised,
then it is beyond the constitutional boundaries of the Federal
Trade Commission's authority to prohibit such advertising.'6
The questions of the distinction between "commercial
speech" and other kinds of speech-questions which go to the
very heart of the meaning and purpose of the first amend-
ment' 7-are questions which require a larger canvas on which
to draw than time or space allows here. My purpose in this
commentary is to indicate the impact of the Pacifica decision
on the arguments concerning the constitutional validity of the
FTC staffs proposed remedies for children's television adver-
tising. In sum, my argument is that Pacifica gives strong addi-
tional weight to the constitutional validity of an FTC effort to
reshape the structure of this nation's television.
I. "COMMERCIAL SPEECH" AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
To set the stage for a discussion of Pacifica, it is necessary
to review briefly the Supreme Court's development of the con-
cept of "commercial speech" as distinguished from speech
which is entitled to first amendment protection. The starting
point is the Court's very brief opinion (later characterized by
" See definition at note 4, supra. "Deception" occurs legally when demonstrably
inaccurate or misleading material is contained in a given advertising message. See,
e.g., FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 386-87 (1965). The term "deception"
still is undergoing some development as better research techniques and expertise con-
tribute to an understanding of how consumers perceive claims (and even meaning)
contained in advertisements. See Preston, A Comment on Defining "Misleading Ad-
vertising" and "Deception in Advertising," J. OF MARKETING, July, 1976, p. 54. Cf.,
Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. FTC, 481 F.2d 246 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1112 (1973). See also Note, Federal Trade Commission: Developments in Adver-
tising and Antitrust Policies, 41 GEO. WASH. L. Rav. 880 (1973).
1' Professor Charles Alan Wright of the University of Texas Law School stated at
hearings on the proposed rule that he has concluded on the basis of his research
(funded by General Mills Corporation), "If there is a constitutional right to present
truthful advertisements of sugared products in other media, there is a constitutional
right to do so on television." BROADCASTING MAGAZINE, March 19, 1979, at 84. Cf.
Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 584 (D.D.C. 1971), affl'd, 405
U.S. 1000 (1972).
1, See generally Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem In The Theory of
Freedom, 62 IowA L. REv. 1 (1976); Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First
Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963); Redish, The First Amendment in the Market-
place: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. Rgv.
429 (1970); Reich, Consumer Protection and the First Amendment: A Dilemma for the
FTC? 61 MINN. L. Rv. 705 (1977).
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Mr. Justice Douglas as "almost offhand"') rendered in 1942 in
Valentine v. Chrestensen. 19 In that matter, a private entrepre-
neur was restricted by New York state law from distributing
handbills advertising the tours of a submarine he had pur-
chased and docked. He unsuccessfully argued that his freedom
of speech had been unconstitutionally restrained by the state's
action.20 The Supreme Court indicated that the first amend-
ment guarantee of freedom of speech provided no protection
against governmental regulation of commercial advertising.
Significantly, Mr. Justice Black, the Supreme Court Justice
generally considered the most vigorous proponent of the over-
riding authority of the right to free speech,2 joined the other
members of the Court in issuing this opinion. Indeed, he found
it appropriate to state in an action arising nearly a decade later
that the first amendment does not extend its protection to the
solicitations of "a 'merchant' who goes from door to door
'selling pots'. ' 22
Apparently, the Supreme Court felt the great purposes of
the first amendment-the guarantee of unbridled speech to
matters of political concern or artistic expression3-are not
normally at issue in matters involving the solicitations of those
wishing to sell goods or services to the public. Thus, neither
Mr. Justice Black nor Mr. Justice Douglas, both ardent advo-
cates of a "strict" interpretation of the first amendment guar-
antee of the right to speak,24 found it inconsistent to support
governmental action regulating trade by prohibiting commer-
cial speech.25
1' Cammanano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959) (concurring opinion).
19 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
20 Id. at 53. Ironically, the New York Court of Appeals many years later declared
the same statute unconstitutional. People v. Remeny, 355 N.E.2d 375 (N.Y. 1976).
2: See, e.g., J. FRANK, MR. JUSTICE BLACK, THE MAN AND His OPINIONS (1949).
Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 650, at footnote (1951) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
2 See, A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1965); Emerson, supra note 17; Re-
dish, supra note 17.
21 See, e.g., the separate dissenting opinions of Justices Black and Douglas in
Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 321-31 (1951).
2 See, e.g., FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 302 U.S. 112 (1937), in which the Court
(per Justice Black) upheld the authority of the Federal Trade Commission to prohibit
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The Supreme Court, in the years following Valentine,
made it very clear that the kind of "commercial speech" to
which it had held the protections of the first amendment did
not extend was only that which simply urged commercial
transactions ("buy my wares"); any kind of speech which was
"editorial" in nature, even though that editorial speech might
also have some elements of commerce involved in it (such as
an advertisement for a newspaper.urging one to subscribe be-
cause of its ideological content) was clearly protected. '" The
former was purely commercial speech; the latter was protected
speech, albeit speech with commercial overtones.
In 1975, in Bigelow v. Virginia27 the Supreme Court had
before it a matter which involved the publication in a Virginia
newspaper of an advertisement for an abortion clinic in New
York. The services advertised were then illegal under Virginia
law, but were legal in New York where they were offered.', A
criminal conviction of the publisher of the newspaper2 1 was
reversed by the Supreme Court. The Court stated that the
advertisement "did more than simply propose a commercial
transaction. It contained factual material of clear 'public inter-
est."'3 The Court also stated that the "relationship of speech
to the marketplace of products or services does not make it
valueless in a marketplace of ideas."3' Thus, for the first time,
the Supreme Court expressly indicated the possible existence
of an area common to both the "marketplace of ideas," pro-
tected by the first amendment, and the marketplace of mere
"commercial speech," generally thought to be unprotected.
The following year, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,32 the Supreme
representations which would fool the "ignorant" and "incredulous" but not a reasona-
ble person.
21 E.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
421 U.S. 809 (1975).
1 1877-78 Va. Acts c. 2, § 8 codified at VA. CODE § 18.1-63 (1950) (as amended by
1960 Va. Acts c. 358), read: "If any person, by publication. . . or in any other manner,
encourage or promote the processing of an abortion. . . he shall be guilty of a misde-
meanor."
Bigelow v. Commonwealth, 191 S.E.2d 173 (Va. 1972).
421 U.S. at 822.
3, Id. at 826.
425 U.S. 748 (1976).
1978-79]
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Court reviewed a state statute which prohibited pharmacists
from advertising the prices of prescription drugs.13 The Court
noted that
the question whether there is a First Amendment exception
for "commercial speech" is squarely before us. Our pharma-
cist [who wishes to advertise but is restrained from doing so
by the statute in question] does not wish to editorialize on
any subject, cultural, philosophical, or political. . . .The
"idea" he wishes to communicate is simply this: "I will sell
you the X prescription drug at the Y price."'"
Significantly, the Supreme Court conceded that the adver-
tiser's interest in this matter was "purely economic," but none-
theless went on to find that this fact hardly disqualified "the
matter for protection under the First Amendment. '3 5 The
Court emphasized that consumers cannot be adequately in-
formed about the prices and availability of goods or services or
the sources from which they are available if information con-
cerning these facts-information normally conveyed through
the medium of advertising-is not readily available to the pub-
lic. 36 The Court, in effect, voiced as its standard the model of
"consumer sovereignty" which the Federal Trade Commission
and other trade regulation authorities utilize in exercising their
administrative or prosecutorial discretion to bring or to forego
action.37
Despite the protection given the "commercial speech" in-
volved in Virginia State Board, the Supreme Court stressed
that commercial speech is not free from governmental regula-
tion simply because it constitutes "free speech." The Court
noted that it had consistently allowed the government to place
restrictions on the "time, place, and manner of any form of free
VA. CODE § 54-524.35(3) (1974).
" 425 U.S. at 760-61.
Id. at 763.
36 Id. at 763-65.
3' See Thain, Book Review, 56 BOSTON U. L. REv. 435, 439-40 (1976). Cf. Snow &
Weisbrod, Consumerism, Consumers and Public Interest Law, in PuBLmc INTEREST LAW
(B. Weisbrod, J. Handler & N. Komesar 1978) at 395-455. See also the collected essays
in ADVERTISING AND SOCIETY (Y. Brozen ed. 1974); Thain, Corrective Advertising:
Theory and Cases, 19 NEw YORK L. F. 1, 17-18 (1973). See generally Pitofsky, Beyond




speech. ' 38 It further noted that both "untruthful" speech
(whether commercial speech or otherwise) and speech which is
deceptive or misleading could be prohibited by the proper gov-
ernmental agencies without violating the first amendment .3 1
Virginia State Board thus stood for the proposition that it
is an infringement of first amendment rights to prohibit normal
commercial advertising but that restrictions on commercial
speech which misleads or deceives remain valid. The validity
of challenges to advertising which constitutes "unfair" prac-
tices, even though not falling under the normal rubric of decep-
tion,4" was not specifically considered by the Court. In any
event, the Court has never specifically reversed or questioned
its ruling in Federal Trade Commission v. Sperry &
Hutchison4' that the Federal Trade Commission may attack
and prohibit trade practices which are unfair to the consuming
public even though the practices are neither deceptive nor anti-
competitive under the traditional definitions of those terms.2
The Virginia State Board decision was soon applied in
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 3 in which the Supreme Court
ruled that efforts by a state to prohibit all advertising by law-
yers violated the first amendment. The Court continued to
confirm the ability of appropriate state authorities to place
"time, place and manner restrictions" on commercial speech."
The Court even hinted that it might be possible to justify
greater restrictions on the advertising of the services of attor-
neys or other professional groups than on advertisements for
standard commercial products. 5 Nonetheless, the case seemed
425 U.S. at 771.
3, Id. at 771-72.
' See note 4 supra for a definition of deception; Thain, supra note 1, at 667-70.
4, 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
41 Id. at 239. See Reed & Coalson, Eighteenth-Century Legal Doctrine Meets
Twentieth-Century Marketing Techniques: F.T.C. Regulation of Emotionally Condi-
tioning Advertising, 11 GA. L. Rev. 733 (1977); Note, Unfairness Without Deception:
Recent Positions of the Federal Trade Commission, 5 LoYoLA U.L.J. 537 (1974); Note,
,Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act-Unfairness to Consumers, 1972 Wis.
L. REv. 1071; Note, Psychological Advertising: A New Area of FTC Regulation, 1972
Wis. L. REv. 1097.
433 U.S. 350 (1977).
" Id. at 384.
Id. at 383-84. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978), where
the Court held that the right of lawyers to advertise does not prevent states from
disciplining those who engage in "ambulance chasing" and other forms of barratry. Cf.
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to many to give greater stature to commercial speech than it
had ever before enjoyed,48 for the decision rested solely on the
protection to be afforded the speech involved. In fact, the Court
specifically rejected an alternative "non-speech" argument by
the advertising lawyers that the prohibition of speech was sim-
ply a restraint of trade in violation of traditional anti-trust
law.17 Bypassing this possible alternative ground for its deci-
sion, the Court explicitly held that the state's prohibition of
lawyer advertising could not be challenged successfully on anti-
trust grounds but was unlawful because it violated the first
amendment." Nonetheless, the Court, consistent with its opin-
ion in Virginia State Board, gave as much emphasis to the need
of consumers to obtain information as it did to the right of
attorneys to provide such information.49 In this sense, it seems
that the Court was, in effect, reinstating the antitrust argu-
ment presented in Bates under the caption of "free speech."'0
Citing these decisions," opponents of the Federal Trade
In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (lawyer's acts of advising women of their legal rights
and of subsequently advising one of the women through a letter of free legal assistance
from a nonprofit organization did not subject her to disciplinary action).
6 See notes 19-26 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the basis for
such a belief.
4 433 U.S. at 359-362.
433 U.S. at 362.
See id. at 363-64 ("such speech should not be withdrawn from protection merely
because it propose(s) a mundane commercial transaction. Even though the speaker's
interest is largely economic, the court has protected such speech in certain contexts
. . ."); id. at 365-66 ("the disciplinary rule serves to inhibit the free flow of commercial
information and to keep the public in ignorance."); id. at 374 ("It seems peculiar to
deny the consumer, on the ground that the information is incomplete, at least some of
the relevant information needed to reach an informed decision.")
11 See id. at 377-78 where the Court, commenting on the state bar association's
argument that lawyer advertising would increase the costs of providing professional
services and thus create "a substantial entry barrier, deterring or preventing young
attorneys from penetrating the market," states, "In the absence of advertising, an
attorney must rely on his contacts with the community to generate a flow of business.
In view of the time necessary to develop such contacts, the ban in fact serves to
perpetuate the market position of established attorneys." This statement appears in
the court's discussion of the first amendment issues involved in the case.
1, One critic of the proposed Rule is Stuart Land, a senior partner in the law firm
of Arnold & Porter. In remarks made during one of a series of seminars concerning
advertising to children held at Georgetown University Law Center under a grant from
the Ford Foundation, Mr. Land characterized the impact of Virginia State Board and
Bigelow as follows:
The courts in the past regarded advertising as a stepchild among the various
areas of business activity which are subject to judicial protection from
TELEVISION ADVERTISING
Commission's children's television advertising rulemaking
proceeding contend that the effort to prohibit advertising as
unfair or deceptive to children-even though the advertising
is not deceptive or misleading in any traditional legal sense of
those words-violates the first amendment. The argument of
these opponents, however strong one may find them-and I
do not find them persuasive-is severely weakened by the
rationale of the Pacifica decision.
II. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation
Pacifica, now celebrated as the "seven dirty words" case,
involved the broadcast by an FM radio station at 2:00 p.m. of
a recording by comedian George Carlin.52 Carlin's recording
dealt, in a quasi-humorous way, with words considered taboo
in our society. Specifically, he recited what he thought are the
seven most taboo words-all related to excretory or sexual bod-
ily functions53 -and treated, in a satirical fashion which many
would find to have a serious underlying purpose, what he con-
sidered to be the hypocrisy of these taboos." A father driving
his automobile in New York, with his young son as a passenger,
heard this program on his car radio and complained to the
Federal Communications Commission." The Federal Commu-
nications Commission, pursuant to statutory authority, fined
the station for carrying "indecent" material. The Supreme
agency regulation. The judicial neglect was rationalized by denying any First
Amendment rights to advertising, and by positing in a group of political
appointees . . . an expertise to determine the the [sic] messages which the
public took from advertising and to decide on the basis of their judgments
and intuition what advertising was false and misleading. But I think those
days for the Commission are pretty much over.
Copies of Mr. Land's remarks are on file at the University of Wisconsin Law School
and the Georgetown University Law Center.
2 98 S. Ct. at 3030.
" The seven words were "shit, piss, fuck, cunt, cocksucker, motherfucker, and
tits." These words were repeated constantly throughout Carlin's twelve minute mono-
logue. 98 S. Ct. at 3041.
" Id. at 3041-43. A transcript of Carlin's monologue is set forth in an appendix to
the Court's opinion.
's 56 F.C.C.2d 94 (1975). The father's complaining letter to the FCC stated that
while he could perhaps understand "the record's being sold for private use, I certainly
cannot understand the broadcast of [it] over the air that, supposedly, you control."
98 S. Ct. at 3030.
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Court, in a closely divided decision,- upheld the authority of
the Federal Communications Commission to discipline a sta-
tion for violating that statute.5 7 Contentions that the action
contravened the first amendment rights of the speaker or the
station were rejected by the majority of the Supreme Court.-
Significantly, the Supreme Court first determined that the
language, as used in the broadcast, was not "obscene." '5 s Be-
cause the Supreme Court has held that "obscene" material is
not entitled to constitutional protection," a decision that the
material was obscene would have supported the FCC's action
without any need to expound on other "free speech" aspects of
the matter. The Court did find the words offensive to many
viewers because their use is normally frowned upon in polite
society.' Consequently, the categorization of these words by
the FCC as "indecent" was appropriate.
The majority emphasized that the broadcast of the mate-
rial at 2:00 in the afternoon made it "uniquely accessible to
children." 2 This accessibility appeared to be an important fac-
tor in the decision. The majority further found that because the
issue arose in the context of broadcasting, rather than in the
print media, any restraint or "chilling effect" on free speech
was less significant than a similar action in the field of publica-
tion.6" Broadcasters, in return for a government license to uti-
54 The majority opinion was written by Mr. Justice Stevens and joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Mr. Justice Rehnquist. Justices Powell and Blackmun joined Jus-
tices Stevens and Rehnquist and the Chief Justice in holding that the FCC's regulation
did not violate the first amendment. 98 S. Ct. at 3030. Mr. Justice Stewart wrote a
dissent, joined by Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall. Id. at 3055. Mr. Justice
Brennan wrote a separate dissenting opinion, joined by Mr. Justice Marshall. Id. at
3047.
-' While the FCC had statutory authority to fine Pacifica for its broadcast, 47
U.S.C. §§ 312(a) and (b) (1976), and 503(b)(1)(E) (1976), the Commission instead had
imposed an informal sanction to be noted in the station's license file, presumably
available for contemplation "in the event that subsequent complaints are received."
56 F.C.C.2d at 99.
11 98 S. Ct. at 3036-41.
Id. at 3033.
See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976); Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
" 98 S. Ct. at 3039. The four dissenting justices would have held the statute
authorizing regulation of indecent language by the FCC must be interpreted so that
only "obscene" language could be regulated. They would not allow regulation of lan-
guage which was no more than "indecent." Id. at 3050.




lize airspace belonging to the public, 4 make a commitment to
operate "in the public interest, convenience and necessity.",5
The Court's decision in Pacifica, coming very close in time
to the decision in the Zurcher v. Stanford Daily case"6 and the
Farber matter, 7 led to a chorus of outcries that the Supreme
Court was fencing in the constitutional zone of freedom of
speech.8 At least insofar as Pacifica is concerned," a little calm
reflection could well lead one to the conclusion that the outcry
might have been undue. The following paragraphs set forth
some arguments that the impact of the decision on free speech
has been overstated. These arguments should be considered as
the brief from a "devil's advocate" hoping to sharpen the lines
of debate as to the actual holding of the "seven dirty words"
case.
The Supreme Court, in Pacifica, did not go so far as to say
that the words found objectionable could never be broadcast
over the public airways; rather, it simply indicated that the
"time, place and manner" of their broadcast would not justify
their unlimited use over airways licensed by the government.
' D. GINSBURG, REGULATION OF BROADCASTING, 170-71 (1979).
" 98 S. Ct. at 3040, citing, inter alia, 47 U.S.C. §§ 309(a), 312(a)(2)i (1976) and
FCC v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S. 223 (1946).
" 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
,7 394 A.2d 330 (1978), cert. denied sub. nom., New York Times Co. v. New Jersey,
99 S. Ct. 598 (1978).
" See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1978, at 1, col. 5; id., Nov. 9, 1978, at 26
(editorial).
This reaction was intensified by the Court's most recent decision in the area of
communications law-holding that when a journalist is alleged to have circulated
defamatory material and is sued for such conduct, the first amendment gives no
privileges to journalists prohibiting an inquiry into the editorial processes of those
responsible for the publication. This decision was rendered in the suit brought by
former Army Lt. Col. Anthony Herbert against the Columbia Broadcasting System
and others associated with the "60 Minutes" program of February 4, 1973, treating
Herbert's activities as a public figure. For industry reaction to this decision, see, e.g.,
"High Court Opens the Minds of Journalists to Investigation," BROADCASTNG
MAGAZINE, April 23, 1979, at 25.
" This commentary is concerned only with the ramifications of Pacifica on the
FTC rulemaking proceeding and does not purport to evaluate the impact or constitu-
tional correctness of the Stanford Daily or Farber decisions, or the effect of Pacifica in
other areas.
1o FCC Commissioner Abbott Washburn stated in a letter to the editor of the New
York Times, "The decision was narrow . . . [the Court] emphasized the nuisance
rationale, the importance of 'context' and the 'channeling' of such matters to hours
when children are not apt to be a significant part of the audience." November 11, 1978.
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It would surely be tragic were the government to use its power
to restrain the airways from containing any satirical or "adult"
material; but that is not what occurred in Pacifica. There is no
indication that the broadcast of the very same material could
be restrained were it to occur at a later evening hour when it is
reasonable to presume that children should not be a significant
part of the audience.
Moreover, utilization of the airways must take into ac-
count the large numbers of listeners or viewers who are not
aware of the nature of the material presented and cannot turn
away from it until it has already entered their viewing or listen-
ing domain." Broadcast matter by its very nature differs from
print matter; those who do not wish to receive written matter
offensive to them have the option of simply ignoring, rejecting,
or refusing such material without preventing the flow of speech
from those who wish to communicate. With broadcasts, the
protection of the recipient will always involve some restriction
Following the Pacifica decision, FCC Chairman Charles Ferris reassured the broadcast
industry that the FCC would exercise extreme restraint in wielding the power author-
ized by the Court. BROADCASTING MAGAZINE, July 24, 1978, at 31. There appears to be
no reason to believe that the present majority of the Commission welcomed the result
in Pacifica. (The FCC's action took place when the agency had an earlier, philosophi-
cally different membership.)
7, The Pacifica opinion cited Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926),
to the effect that "a nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place-like a
pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard." Mr. Justice Stevens then added, "We simply
hold that when the Commission finds that a pig has entered the parlor, the exercise of
its regulatory power does not depend on proof that the pig is obscene." 98 S. Ct. at
3041.
If there were greater controls available for listeners or viewers to utilize in deter-
mining what broadcasts will enter one's home or automobile, then much of the ration-
ale of the majority's opinion in Pacifica would appear to be moot. For example, cable
television subscribers in many areas of the country (including my own area of Madison,
Wisconsin) may receive, for a monthly fee, uncensored films and other material not
available on commercial television. Such programming in recent months has included
a program of material by George Carlin including the words "you can't say on televi-
sion." Those subscribing to this system receive, if they desire, the means to "lock"
their television sets so children may not use it without parental acquiesence. I have
been informed, in personal conversations with Professor Geoffery Cowan of the
U.C.L.A. Law School and others who follow developments in communications, that it
is now possible, technically, to produce a mechanism which would "lock out" or turn
off portions of telecast material that viewers do not wish to see. The possibility that
such a device might be promoted principally as a means for viewers to eliminate
unwanted commercials from "commercial television" does not please broadcasters or
advertisers and the future of this device is uncertain.
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upon the speaker. Opponents of Pacifica have yet to indicate
satisfactorily why it is less appropriate for government to limit
the times at which speech offensive to many members of so-
ciety may be spoken on public airwaves than it is for govern-
ment to restrain candidates for political office from urging
people to vote for them-surely the epitome of political speech
-by utilizing sound trucks running through residential
neighborhoods at times when the majority of residents could be
expected to be sleeping.72
Much of the reaction to the Pacifica decision is of what
may be termed a "knee jerk" type-there seems little in the
way of "freedom" which has been lost as a result of the decision
other than the freedom repeatedly to say "shit" and "fuck" and
similar words at any time on media licensed by the govern-
ment. Vigilance concerning the potential reach or "chilling
effect" of any decision restraining speech must be exercised,
but the precise limits Pacifica places on speech are narrow
indeed. Perhaps more significantly, this restriction of speech
hardly compares with the restraints broadcasters place on
speech thought offensive to sponsors or other important
commercial interests.73 Few raise objections to this pernicious
form of censorship even though it often prohibits specific
reference to, let alone discussion of, matters clearly in the
"marketplace of ideas."' 7'
71 This analogy is not intended to be exact but only to point out that certain
limitations may be placed on most speech. (Also, I realize it is more likely for sound
trucks rolling through a residential neighborhood in the wee hours of the morning to
be proclaiming the virtues of one's opponent rather than of oneself). Still, there are
striking similarities in the two matters.
" Examples of such censorship include the deletion of the word "gas" from the
phrase "gas chamber" on a telecast about Nazi atrocities. The telecast was sponsored
by the American Gas Association. Another example is General Electric Theater's re-
fusal to telecast (due to the title) a version of Rudyard Kipling's "The Light That
Failed." See, e.g., E. BARNoUW, THE SPONSOR: NoTEs ON A MODERN POTENTATE, 48-55
(1978).
7' A classic instance of sponsor censorship that undercut political elements of a
program's script occurred in a 1978 episode of the ABC network comedy series "Barney
Miller." This series is based on the daily activities in a fictitious New York police
precinct; the episode involved a jailed "radical" voicing dissent to American involve-
ment in Vietnam. In the filmed production, his statement mentioned two American
corporations, Dow Chemical and DuPont, by name. When advised by network lawyers
that the two companies might bring legal action, ABC's Standards and Practices
Department (the network's censors) responded by erasing the audio portion of the
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However consistent one finds the result in Pacifica to be
with the basic purposes of the first amendment, the underlying
rationale of the majority in Pacifica-that it is constitutionally
appropriate to place certain restrictions on speech which is
broadcast to an audience including many chil-
dren-strengthens the FTC's position that its rulemaking pro-
ceeding is considering remedies which would not violate the
first amendment. With the holding of the decision thus pre-
sented, we can now consider the impact of Pacifica on the
FTC's rulemaking proceeding.
The FTC is proposing that certain television advertising
be eliminated or restricted because it is directed to children at
times when they compose the majority of the viewing audi-
ence.75 There is no effort on the part of the Federal Trade Com-
mission to say that those who now advertise their products to
children on children's television programs will be prevented
from using television to advertise their products at times when
children are not the majority of the audience. Nor is there any
effort to say that these people may not advertise their wares on
other media. The limitations proposed by the Federal Trade
Commission staff are addressed only to television, and are sug-
gested because of the nature of the audience (children) receiv-
ing the messages.
videotape that mentioned the company names. See Wisconsin State Journal, section
1, p.2, December 9, 1978.
Of course, this type of censorship is not undertaken by any agency of government,
but by private companies or individuals in the context of making business decisions
(albeit broadcasters are supposedly acting as temporary private trustees of the public
airwaves). My point is not that these actions violate the first amendment, but that
they thwart the goal of robust discussion of public issues. The size and power of many
"private" actors in our society often rivals or exceeds that of government. Indeed, it
may not be inappropriate to consider organizations such as General Motors or CBS as
"private government" insofar as their impact on citizens is concerned.
15 The FTC's proposal actually refers to an audience where children comprise a
"significant percentage" of the viewers. However, this is most likely to result in a
definition centering on "majority" composition, due in part to the complexity of devis-
ing any other standard. Some consumer groups have urged other standards in order to
take into account the large numbers of children who watch prime-time television, yet
who comprise less than half the audience for shows broadcast during those hours.
Nevertheless, the FTC's announcement of its proposed Rule explicitly noted that one
of the petitions for rulemaking before it defined the term "children's programming"
so as to cover those shows where the "average audience consist[s] of 50 percent or
more individuals under 12 years of age." 43 Fed. Reg. 17,698, n.8 (1978).
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Pacifica therefore seems particularly pertinent to the con-
stitutional objections raised to the rulemaking proposals. In
Pacifica, the Supreme Court found it appropriate for an agency
of the government, acting under a properly adopted statute, to
limit the broadcast of speech which was inconsistent with the
statute. In the FTC's rulemaking proceeding, the Commission,
under a valid statute administered by it (Section 5 of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act), is attempting to limit the broad-
cast of "commercial speech" at times when children form the
principal audience to which that "speech" is addressed. As-
suming, arguendo, that the Commission will be able to demon-
strate that the utilization of this "speech" towards an audience
of children is unfair or deceptive and therefore in violation of
the statute, there appear to be no consititutional restraints on
Commission action prohibiting or severely restricting such
matter. Even if the Court in Pacifica had reached an opposite
conclusion, such a decision would not impede the FTC's rule-
making activity. Unlike Pacifica, the material dealt with by
the FTC in the rulemaking proceeding is not program matter
(which generally is protected speech), but is "commercial
speech" which, as noted above, clearly is not entitled to the full
protection given other speech under the Constitution. As it is,
the result in Pacifica greatly strengthens the conclusion that
the FTC staff's proposals are within the boundaries of the first
amendment.
CONCLUSION
In the words of Philip Elman, a former Federal Trade
Commissioner, former law clerk to Supreme Court Justice
Felix Frankfurter, and a noted constitutional lawyer, the im-
pact of the Supreme Court's decisions in the commercial
speech area essentially seem to paraphrase George Orwell's
famous phrase in Animal Farm that "all pigs are created equal,
but some pigs are more equal than others"76 by finding that "all
speech is created equal, but some speech is more equal than
others."77 In essence, despite certain scraps of language, recent
holdings of the Supreme Court in matters involving commer-
7' G. ORWELL, ANMAL FARM (1946).
7 Elman, The New Constitutional Right to Advertise, 64 A.B.A.J. 206, 208 (1978).
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cial speech indicate that such speech is not speech which rises
to the stature of full constitutional protection and may be se-
verely restricted under appropriate circumstances. The Su-
preme Court's decision in Pacifica does not deal with commer-
cial speech but it does indicate the more limited application of
the first amendment to speech in the broadcast media. Pacifica
also demonstrates the significance of protection of the child
audience in weighing first amendment arguments against gov-
ernment regulation. These considerations weigh much more
heavily when commercial speech, such as television advertising
to children, is involved.
In brief, "commercial speech" may be "speech" which
cannot-as once thought-be prohibited willy-nilly, but which
can be subjected to appropriate governmental restrictions.
Such restrictions are particularly appropriate when broadcast-
ing is involved or when the audience to which the messages are
addressed is an audience entitled to special protection, such as
the child audience."' Both considerations apply to the FTC's
rulemaking proceeding.
As a result of Pacifica, broadcasters now may not, with
impunity, utilize the "seven dirty words" expunged by the
Supreme Court from afternoon broadcast. Perhaps in the fu-
ture, as a result of FTC rulemaking activity, they may be un-
able to impose on children's television programs words exhort-
ing youngsters to buy their "pots" or other wares. Whatever the
political consequences of the effort by the FTC to restructure
television advertising to children, the constitutional guarantee
Is The importance of these considerations is evident from the fact that while the
five Justices forming the majority agreed that the combination of the special character-
istics of broadcasting, the need to protect the child audience, and proper deference to
one's right to reject speech (particularly in one's own home) rendered the FCC's action
valid under the first amendment, these members divided as to the worth of the speech
at issue in Pacifica. The Chief Justice joined Justices Stevens and Rehnquist in assert-
ing that "such utterances [as Carlin's] are no essential part of any exposition of ideas,
and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality."
98 S. Ct. at 3039, (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
Justices Powell and Blackmun disagreed, stating that it was not within the proper
province of the Supreme Court "to decide on the basis of its content which speech
protected by the First Amendment is most 'valuable' and hence deserving of the most
protection, and which is less 'valuable' and hence deserving of less protection." Id. at
3046.
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of free speech presents no barrier; the underlying concerns of
the majority in Pacifica clearly demonstrate the validity of this
assertion. A salesman's broadcast pitch to an immature audi-
ence is not to be confused with the philosophical, political, or
artistic expression shielded by the first amendment. 9
7' See Hammer, FTC Knights and Consumer Daze: The Regulation of Deceptive
or Unfair Advertising, 32 ARK. L. Ra'. 446, 453-55 (1978); Wolinsky & Econome,
Seduction in Wonderland: The Need for a Seller's Fiduciary Duty Toward Children,
4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 249 (1977).

